Is it indeed legitimate for a country to declare that a war will not end until the very last of its enemies is found, stopped and defeated? We argue that the answer is no, at least under the realistic assumption that reducing risk to oneself transfers it to others, many of whom are innocent. We argue that there is a reasonable degree of risk that every country must live with, including the risk of attack by a nonstate actor.
International law, as well as most of just war theory, has more to say about the beginning of war than about its ending. In its modern formulation under the United Nations (UN) Charter, peace?
8 Might an uneasy, long-term truce-perhaps punctuated by occasional violations-be the best that a state can rightfully hope for?
Our claim that warring states cannot equate successful self-defense with zero or near zero risk runs parallel to a similar and familiar claim in the jus in bello, which absolutely prohibits warring parties from engaging in certain acts, even when such acts may reduce the security risk and enhance security for themselves. If one believed that states have a right to demand zero risk, there would be no justification for a strict body of jus in bello that was not subordinate to considerations of military necessity. Nor would there be any limitation on the use of force in preemptive self-defense in an attempt to prevent future threats, whether imminent or merely possible.
From the claim that states cannot demand zero risk it follows that the legitimate goal of war cannot be the complete annihilation of the enemy's military capacity merely to remove the threat it poses. As a general principle, the defending state also cannot condition the end of war on peace in the active, Augustinian sense, nor even a formal agreement that anchors favorable security arrangements, but only peace as a kind of wary modus vivendi. 9 That is not to say that the modus vivendi could never ripen into something fuller and more harmonious-consider how the relationship between France and Germany has evolved from 1945 (or 1918, or 1815) until now. Our contention is merely that a warring party is not entitled to keep fighting after the modus vivendi has become attainable, even though the modus vivendi leaves the state in some tacit. The jus ex bello question then is how long the parties can continue to fight before they must cease fire, or on what conditions they must accept an invitation from their adversary to cease fire.
With no formal surrender by the enemy, the onus lies on states to determine when their risk has shrunk to the point where they must stop. 10 This is a familiar and fraught issue, often framed as when a state must get off a war footing and stop treating its adversaries according to the rules of war, substituting instead the stricter rules of peacetime law enforcement.
One answer other than zero risk might be that the conflict must end (to be replaced with law enforcement) when the risk has been reduced to whatever background risk the state had experienced in the years before the conflict began. Call this level the prior background risk. It is not the only possibility, however. One could imagine that the prior background risk might leave life nearly unlivable in some unfortunate states that face perpetual conflict. So an alternative would be bearable risk. We will instead propose a conception of morally legitimate bearable risk, and explore some complications in establishing it. We call the principle that states may not shift risks onto outsiders once they have attained the morally legitimate bearable risk Just Management of Military Risk. States may not raise others' risks above that minimum in order to reduce their own risk below it. This is the argument of section IV below.
Section V explores some practical difficulties with risk assessment in the war context, while section VI notices that state may have non-military methods for reducing risks, which may imply moral constraints on risk reduction through military action-a point of importance in both the jus ad bellum and the jus ex bello.
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II. Self-Defense and Risk
10 No doubt there are parallel issues for the non-state actor, but our focus in this paper is on states and state obligations. 11 The alternatives may well have implications for the jus in bello as well, but we bracket those out in the present paper.
A. Debates over the Scope of Art. 51 as Debates over Risk
Ever since the conclusion of the UN Charter in 1945, scholars and policy makers have found it impossible to agree on the exact scope of the Article 51 self-defense exception, including the conditions upon which states can begin, pursue, or must end wars. Controversies sparked over the threshold of an "armed attack" that justifies the use of force in self-defense, 12 whether a state may use force in the face of an armed attack that emanates from a non-state actor, 13 whether it may use force preemptively, before an attack has even materialized, whether self-defense includes other-defense as well, 14 the exact meaning of the temporal condition, "until the Security Council has taken measures," and more.
Complicating these questions was not only the vague language of Article 51 itself, but the operation of the customary international law principles, namely ad bellum necessity and proportionality, that most commentators believe complement the Article. 15 Some argue that the customary scope of the "inherent right of self-defense" includes preventive war, and reading it that way broadens self-defense beyond what the literal language of Article 51 permits. Notably, this has been the official position of the United States government. 16 Other commentators, conversely, hold that preemptive strikes are permissible only against highly imminent threats, while yet others deny the right to engage in any kind of anticipatory self-defense.
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Once force is used under Article 51, commentators disagree on its permissible scope:
Some argue that legitimate self-defense is solely what it takes to repel the initial assault, a greater number think that self-defense may be exercised not only to repel the immediate threat, but also to deter future attacks, and a few hold that by attacking in the first place, the attacking state has opened itself up to complete overpowering by its enemy, including the toppling of its regime and long-term occupation.
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As indicated earlier, these various options correspond to different levels of risk reduction, And yet, the problem for states that face violent threats from external enemies is exacerbated by two factors. First, the international system lacks central policing and enforcement mechanisms, which in effective state structures operate to reduce some level of risk to citizens from each other. In an important sense, this makes the international order a self-help system, and notwithstanding the UN Security Council, the allocation of risk is up to the immediate interested parties to determine and secure.
Second, states have a special obligation to protect their citizens from man-made harm, especially violence, both internal and external. Call these the internal and external Leviathan functions of the state. Following Hobbes and Weber, some might say the Leviathan functions are the most basic raison d'être of states, the common denominator they all share. A state that neglects these repressive obligations has failed morally; practically, it is bound to come under both internal and external pressures to change its form, government, or collapse altogether.
When a state faces threats to its national security or the security of its citizens, it must take defensive actions, some of which will entail harming some people for the benefit of others.
When those harmed are foreign civilians and those benefitted are national citizens, the state is engaged in risk transfer onto outsiders. The extent to which considerations of global justice permit a state to privilege the welfare of its own citizens over the welfare of outsiders is an ethical and political question that is almost impossible to answer in the abstract, and we do not propose to address it here. It implicates perennial debates over the differences between killing and letting die, acts and omissions, cosmopolitanism and communitarianism. It faces further complications in the Leviathan context, where the issue is not the just distribution of goods but redistribution of physical risks through the infliction of violence on others.
Nevertheless, even non-cosmopolitans should concede that there are limits to how much violence a state may inflict on outsiders in the name of its own security and that of its people.
Conversely, even the most cosmopolitan view should concede the point we are arguing here, namely that a state that holds its fire in the face of violence to its own citizens has usually not lived up to its basic political obligation.
We stop well short of offering an "exchange rate" between the lives of our own citizens and the lives of others. Our point is merely to emphasize that this exchange rate, which governments conceivably may treat as greater than one, is far from infinite. And our concern is that within the framework of war, the reflex tendency to discount others' lives becomes even greater than in other distributive settings.
III. Risk Perception and Acceptability
A. Peculiarities of risk perception
We have suggested that the state's internal and external Leviathan functions are legitimate reasons for states and their citizens to focus special attention on external threats of politically motivated violence, and invest them with special significance. Yet we also believe that the focus on terrorism and military enemies is often blown far out of any reasonable
proportion that the arguments we have noted will support.
It is puzzling but true that in some contexts of our lives, we are content to live with perpetual and significant risk, while in others, we reject almost any, even where the resulting harm if it were to materialize is similar. The probability of harm from car accidents is far greater than the harm from plane crashes, even where adjusted to frequency of use. This is not an inherent feature of cars or planes, but a regulatory preference grounded in public sentiment.
While no transportation ministry plans for or operates on the assumption of zero car accidents, the air travel industry and regulatory agencies are all geared towards zero plane crashes.
Pure economic analysis that weighs the benefits of the product/activity against the costs of prohibiting or restricting it altogether explains some of these differences, but not all.
Numerous studies have shown that psychological, social, and cultural attitudes -often irrational in their assessment of the actual risk -account not only for personal attitudes but also for odd regulatory choices. 22 The availability heuristic, in particular, drives people to exaggerate the overall probability of salient harms. And dramatic events -such as plane crashes -tend to imprint themselves on our psyche far more than the more frequent, ordinary occurrences. And, of course, nothing seems as out of our control as the stratagems and devices of sworn enemies who wish to do us harm. Likewise, very little enhances our sense of control more than being able to unleash our own military on those enemies. The malevolent and illegitimate (from our perspective) motivations of the enemy further distinguish the risk of war from the more impersonal risks of natural disasters, disease, or accidents. Small wonder, then, that terrorism is such a salient risk, and that waging war on terrorism seems like such a significant risk-reducer, even if our actuarial risk of terrorist violence is slight while our military attacks may recruit and provoke new enemies who make us even less safe, and even if more Americans end up dying in the course of prosecuting the war.
Still, rather than dismissing the overemphasis on terrorism as sheer irrationality, we must accept what it stands for: the fact that citizens worry more about politically-motivated attacks than other forms of harm, and that faced with the threat of such attacks, they demand that their leaders act in order to prevent them, even if such acts are irrational in terms of their simple costs and benefits. 27 Citizens, after all, are entitled to prefer some risks to others. And it is possible that no irrationality is in play: A person who fears death by heart attack more than death at the hands of a drunk driver-even if the probabilities were identical and both deaths nearly instantaneous-is not irrational per se. Neither is his neighbor whose preferences are just the reverse. However, risk preferences, like risk perceptions, are not givens; they can be shaped and manipulated by data, policies, and expectations. 28 Consequently, while it is undoubtedly the leader's responsibility to protect her citizens from the threats of terrorism or war, it is also her obligation to educate her public about manageable and unmanageable threats, and-as we shall argue-just and unjust preference rankings.
It is clearly politically difficult for a leader to concede that not all terrorism, nor all wars, can be prevented, and that the public must learn to live with some degree of political violence.
29
One might also argue that democracy demands that a leader be attentive to the public's preferences, including non-rational or even irrational preferences. The extent to which a leader must educate the public rather than cater to its wishes, however misguided, is a difficult question in political theory. And yet, where catering to the public's wishes based on mistaken risk perceptions imposes significant dangers to those outside that public, we think that the leader's obligation cannot be merely to act as an agent for the popular will.
What of the argument that states' external Leviathan function-providing security against external violence-justifies giving special salience to military risks? In response, we note that modern states are no longer pure Leviathan states whose focus must be principally on reducing bring a nation's economy to its knees with cyber attacks, or launch biological attacks against its food supply, even the traditional security-focused Leviathan must branch out from the study of war to the studies of public health and bank security. Further still from the traditional security function, states regularly screen persons and goods that enter the country in order to avoid pandemics.
This observation suggests that while states and their citizens undoubtedly may rank security risks as more important than others without being guilty of irrationality, their attitudes toward risk should not grossly inflate the difference between risks of the same (relative) magnitude. 30 Call this maxim Minimum Consistency Toward Risks.
We do not consider Minimum Consistency Toward Risks to be either a legal or a moral requirement of just war theory. It would, after all, be very strange if the moral requirement for ceasing or foregoing war against others were regulated by the attacker's risk preferences about food safety or clean air. Rather, it is a useful heuristic to guard against an unjust preference for overemphasizing security risks. In other words, we acknowledge that people may have a legitimate preference for preventing terrorism or war over preventing equally dangerous pandemics or even crimes; our concern is that the ability to shift the costs of prevention of terrorism or war onto a foreign population makes it a more attractive target for risk reduction than earthquakes or pandemics or any other that demand greater domestic sacrifices. The Minimum Consistency heuristic is intended to make states and their citizens question their motivations in their choice of resource allocation.
In the following section, we elaborate on the difference between our attitudes toward risk in the "war on terror" and the "war on crime," to illustrate further the discrepant treatment of 30 We say "relative magnitude" because large states like Russia or the United States could better tolerate a nuclear attack than a small state; what counts as an existential threat to the latter need not to the former. similar risks by national policies. The comparison is especially illuminating as both type of risks are "illegitimate," i.e., are generated by actors who are ill-intentioned and who seek to inflict intentional harm, and both are the concern of the traditional Leviathan functions of states.
B. Crime and War
The term "war" has been adopted for various spheres outside of its original signified of political violence among organized groups. It is now used to describe public campaigns to fight crime, drugs, poverty, global warming, and even obesity. 31 Of all these, the most natural comparison for our present purposes is the "war on crime." Crime threatens the safety and wellbeing of the citizens of a state, and on a statistical scale, and in terms of human toll, it may inflict a greater harm than most modern wars, at least for stronger countries. The Leviathan state is under an obligation, moral and political, to protect citizens from the effects of crime. The adoption of public compensation schemes for victims of violent crime by various countries evidences the view that by allowing citizens to fall victim to crime, the state has failed to discharge its obligation.
32 And yet, it is obvious to all those concerned -government and citizens alike -that some degree of crime will always be present and that the risk of violent crime will never be reduced to zero. This is true for both democracies and autocracies. 
IV. Managing Risks Justly
Our overall conclusion is that there may be legitimate reasons for states and their citizens to emphasize the risks of politically-motivated violence by enemies over other risks, even where such preference cannot be explained merely by looking at the number of lives spent or saved.
And yet, at least in some instances (including the U.S. war on terror) the emphasis on political violence has likely been exaggerated far beyond what those reasons will support. Those reasons, 36 Although note James Forman's observation that the war on terrorism derived much of its legitimacy from the "war on crime." James Forman, Jr., " As we indicated earlier, prior background risk derives the baseline from pre-conflict ("peacetime") experience. An example may be found in U.S. President Barack Obama's widelyreported speech on national security in May 2013. There, the president compared the risk of terrorism by Al Qaeda to "the types of attacks we faced before 9/11," and reminded his audience of attacks in the 1980s and 1990s that-terrible as they were-did not place the country on a war footing. His conclusion was that if the risk of terrorism could be held "below the level that we saw on the eve of 9/11" it is time to declare the armed conflict over. geography. This would be a conception of how everyday life should be led without perpetual worry that the bullets will start flying, that a knapsack bomb will detonate in café or a subway, that the militias will come to rape the women, or that the drones buzzing perpetually overhead will launch a missile into the house next door. In the thought experiment, one would imagine the precautions necessary to live under different levels and forms of risk-the precautions that would plausibly allow a person to "keep calm and carry on"-and judge whether the distortions they impose on everyday life as experienced in a similar society during peacetime could be accepted under any plausible conception of a decent life.
We will not pursue the thought experiment here. Whatever its conclusion, it sets one benchmark: the top of the range of legitimate bearable risk, such that any greater risk would make everyday life unbearable to the affected population. Starting from that benchmark, the bottom of the range becomes clearer: it is the lowest risk that a society (for example, the United States) can achieve without raising the risk to people in another society (for example, the tribal areas of Pakistan) beyond what is legitimately bearable in the moral sense just defined.
Of course, morally legitimate bearable risk will be a range and not a numerical pinpoint, particularly given the vagaries of risk perception we discussed above, which might lead people to take onerous precautions for reasons that are not rationally defensible. It is also a qualitative, not a quantitative standard. Perhaps the best we will do at expressing it is through the two conditions we just mentioned: fortunate societies that enjoy high levels of security cannot expect to keep However, even if we identify background risk with morally legitimate bearable risk, a second objection presents itself, which has to do with the morality of being exposed to risk.
Earlier we observed that military risks arise from a potential adversary's military capacity coupled with their will to fight. One factor in the will to fight is a sense of grievance. States, peoples, or non-state actors with intense grievances will inevitably pose heightened risk to those they believe have wronged them. Whether that heightened risk is part of the morally legitimate risk their adversaries must accept depends on whether the perceived grievances are justified. 43 One might object that the criterion for evaluating moral principles is truth, not usability; we think that objection misses the distinctive roots of moral principles in practical rather than theoretical reasoning. A moral principle useless for deliberating and judging seems to us language on a holiday.
One form of unusability is epistemic: the principle requires knowledge that is too hard to obtain in the circumstances of action or judgment. This may be factual knowledge (in a border clash between states, who started it?), but it includes cases when using a principle to resolve a normative question would require resolving a prior normative question that is harder and the answer to which is unsettled and perhaps unsettlable. 44 Paradigmatically, these include disputes imperfectly, the point of view of the universe, and see everything from the outside…; and from that outside view, I can assign to them a value." Williams, "The Point of View of the Universe: Sidgwick and the Ambitions of Ethics," in Making Sense of Humanity and Other Philosophical Papers 1982 -1993 (Cambridge University Press, 2010 , p. 169. Williams rejects judging "from the point of view of the universe" because in ethics there is no such thing as "a view from no point of view at all." Judging no less than deliberating must be done "from within the substance of my own life." Ibid., p. 170. That substance, it seems to us, includes the constraints of bounded rationality. 44 For example, a familiar criticism of Jeff McMahan's view that soldiers must decide whether killing in war is justified by deciding whether the war is just (he calls this the "Permissibility of Participation" doctrine) is that the ad bellum question may be more than soldiers can be expected to answer. In our terminology, this criticism objects that the Permissibility of Participation doctrine is epistemically unusable by the soldiers who must apply it. In response, McMahan has proposed a jus ad bellum court or expert body to provide an epistemic authority on which soldiers could rely. Jeff McMahan, "The Prevention of Unjust Wars," in Benbaji and Sussmann, eds., Reading Walzer, pp. 241-52. Whether McMahan's proposal could work is debatable, given the difficulty of real-time fact investigation in war zones. We have our doubts. Regardless of who is right, the noteworthy point is that McMahan's proposal takes seriously the requirement of epistemic usability. Although this is not the place for a full-fledged discussion of usability as a requirement on moral principles, we note that the requirement of usability is a demanding one with strong implications. Notoriously, the actutilitarian injunction to do that which maximizes expected utility is often epistemically unusable. To determine which course of action maximizes expected utility requires assignments of payoffs and probabilities to all possible courses of action; for obvious reasons, a genuine utility calculation of this sort is impossible. Instead we simplify by over religion or other incompatible comprehensive doctrines. These are disputes all the way down to first premises; furthermore, they are disputes about something that matters a great deal to the disputing parties. Such disputes are, we will say, essentially intractable.
Epistemic unusability is the issue in our Kashmir example. The question of who has the right to Kashmir is intractable on normative as well as epistemic grounds: India and Pakistan disagree not only over who did what to whom during the decades of sporadic armed conflict, but also over the democratic bona fides of the 1947 legal instrument giving Kashmir to India and, possibly also, over whether a Muslim-majority region can legitimately be governed by India-a question that implicates theological issues. A conception of morally acceptable risk that requires answering the essentially intractable question of who has the right to Kashmir is an unusable conception.
When a principle is unusable, we must find a usable surrogate. Of course, concluding that a principle is unusable does not show that the best surrogate is one that brackets essentially intractable questions and pretends they are off the table. But we think such a strategy can be attractive on roughly contractualist grounds. A principled resolution of the question of legitimate risk should be one that no party could reasonably reject. But any party can reasonably reject a concession on essentially intractable issues. Mutual recognition of this fact supports the bracketing strategy.
What we have labeled "morally legitimate bearable risk" follows the bracketing strategy, and offers a standard that does not assume the existing status quo of risk is justified, nor that allin claims of justice and morality are necessary determinants of a just risk management regime.
examining only a small number of options, arbitrarily limiting time horizons, guessing the known unknowns, ignoring the unknown unknowns, and hoping for the best. That is, the principle of maximizing expected utility is usable only in a dramatically simplified surrogate form, which is very likely over-or under-inclusive.
Instead, the morally justified bearable risk demands that parties at war temper their claims of justice with the realities of an anarchic and conflicted international system and accept some degree of risk as inevitable and full justice as unattainable (of course, our principle says nothing about the parties' right to redress their grievances through means other than the use of force). In short, it is morally incumbent on parties in conflict to accept a ceasefire that does not address all their underlying grievances nor eliminates all future risks to security -but merely reduces the military risk to a mutually bearable level.
For that reason, warring parties that begin in environments with above-average prior background risk may, under a risk-based jus ex bello, have to settle for a bearable but still aboveaverage background risk. It does not follow, however, that parties enjoying below-average prior background risk can insist on fighting until their antebellum level of safety has been restored-at least when doing so shunts the risk onto innocent others.
Consider a prominent example, operations by the United States and its coalition partners in Afghanistan since 2001. We will stipulate that, in the aftermath of 9/11, the United States had a just self-defensive objective in invading Afghanistan to demolish the Al Qaeda enclaves it was sheltering. Doing so may have saved thousands of U.S. lives and vast amounts of U.S. property.
We also stipulate that pulling out of Afghanistan too soon may well have left the United States in even greater jeopardy than before 9/11. At the same time, however, the risk to Afghan civilians rose; the invasion is a paradigm example of a state transferring risk from its own people to other Minimum Consistency Toward Risks suggests that states should not adopt grossly inconsistent policies toward military and non-military risks. Suppose, for example, that two propositions are true: that someday terrorists might get a nuclear weapon and that would be very bad; and that someday climate change might make the world barely habitable, and that too would be very bad. If the state proves unwilling to do much about the climate risk, because it's too costly, or too inconvenient, or some technical fix will be found, or "in the long run we're all dead," then it should hesitate to demand the right to launch wars or continue wars because of the terrorist nuclear risk. It also follows that legal analyses of the "inherent right of self-defense" are mistaken if they maintain that after an enemy has used force against a state, the state can keep fighting until the risk the enemy poses is fully neutralized (although certainly, the fact that an enemy has manifested its hostile intents makes the case for defense stronger than in the case of prevention against a future theoretical threat).
V. Risk Assessment
The simplest way to assess risk is by reference to its expected harm, that is, the probability of a bad event happening multiplied by the magnitude of harm such an event would bring about. In the context of war, this would mean the probability of an attack multiplied by the harm such an attack would inflict.
While the mathematical concept is simple, its execution in practice proves incredibly difficult. Risks analysts have long lamented the weakness of this exercise. Some experts attribute this weakness to the inherent irrationality of the assessors (discussed above in our observations about risk perception), while others blame it on the insurmountable uncertainties and unknowns that prohibit us from evaluating either the probabilities or the anticipated harms.
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In the realm of international relations, and war in particular, risk assessment has been notoriously inaccurate, with both optimism and pessimism plaguing the exercise. Pessimism is perhaps more understandable, given that the experts whose business it is to assess security threats -the military establishment, the defense industry, even the press -also have an interest in playing these threats up. The greater the supposed risk, the easier it becomes to attract attention, have not used minimax in the thermonuclear arms race or the siting of nuclear reactors-but neither have we built policies on mathematical expected value; rather, we have simply rolled the dice and counted on the favorable odds. 47 The probability of no attack each year is 0.9, and 0.9 15 (the probability of no attack in fifteen years) is about 20 percent. Of course, this computation treats the years as independent events, which will not always be true. 48 Nor should the conclusion be that in every case, the tangible and concrete harms of force must override any uncertain advantage that may arise from using force. Instead, it must be that parties who seek to use force to meet uncertain threats must invest a great deal in better assessment of the expected harms of the risk, in averting these harms in other possible ways, and in ensuring that force is used only to the extent justified by those expected harms.
Our earlier principles may in fact help reduce the sources of indeterminacy. Consider the problem of time-horizons, exemplified by the point that a 10% annual risk of attack implies an 80% likelihood of an attack within fifteen years. Are analysts entitled to use the 80% figure in deciding whether to launch a preventive attack? Here, one should begin by noticing that the same arithmetic holds for all risks, military and non-military. The principle we labeled Minimum Consistency Toward Risks suggests using a fifteen-year time horizon in this policy only if we do so in other policies as well. 49 And the "one percent doctrine," used as justification for otherwise-unjustified military action, violates Just Management of Military Risks because it permits the United States to treat a small probability of harm as a large probability, and thus to insist on the U.S. right to use 49 [REMOVED FOR ANONYMITY] military force to diminish a small probability to zero or near zero without granting reciprocal liberty to others. After all, the United States plainly would not permit others to use force against U.S. military assets because there is a one percent chance that the United States will invade.
Wrong assessments might also be checked, to some extent, by expanding the circle of assessors beyond those immediately concerned. A significant challenge here is that the costs of managing the risk will often be shifted onto foreigners and away from those making the assessment. This warrants some form of consultation with other countries and/or intelligence agencies in assessing potential threats. A consultation process is far from offering a definite remedy: some of the most professional western intelligence agencies (CIA, MI6, Mossad) were united in the belief that Iraq was developing WMDs in the lead-up to the U.S. invasion, while no major intelligence agency reportedly anticipated the Arab Spring that was sparked off in Tunisia. 50 Nor are other countries and their intelligence agencies neutral assessors of political risks, or candid reporters of their own assessments.
The UN Security Council could, as Thomas Franck suggested, perform a jury-like function that would assess the evidence of risk and recommend an appropriate response to it.
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We are not confident that this function should be exercised only by the Security Council, given its structure and frequent deadlock. In addition, information made available to the Security force, or its decision to continue using force past the point where, arguably, it has succeeded in repelling the enemy and degrading the threat it continues to pose.
VI. Risk Allocation and Manipulation
Here we wish to expand on an idea alluded to earlier, namely that there are steps prudent states can take to reduce their own risks, prior to the resort to force. These will suggest two additional limitations on the use of force in addition to those we have presented so far.
Neither the probabilities of risk nor the magnitude of harms if it materializes are generally fixed. Like perceptions, probabilities and harms can be manipulated in a way that either increases or decreases them. The probability of getting cancer can be reduced by avoiding smoking and handling hazardous materials. The harm of cancer can be reduced by early detection and better treatments. In some cases, the probability is fixed, such as in the case of earthquakes, but the harm can be reduced by preventing people from living in earthquake-prone regions, enforcing more stringent building codes, employing some early warning systems, and improving first-response systems to disaster-stricken areas. In other cases, it is the harm that is fixed, for instance, the harm from consuming poisonous food, but one can reduce the probability of such consumption by enforcing strict safety standards on the food industry.
In the context of war, too, expected harm is subject to manipulation. Unlike earthquakes, the risk of war is not exogenous: A victim or potentially-victim state can affect the probability of war through its own actions, be they diplomatic or military. A concerned state might threaten an enemy and deter it from action, incapacitate the enemy, or reach a negotiated compromise that would reduce the probability of war. A victim or potentially-victim state can also affect the potential harm that might ensue from war. It can invest in defensive weapons systems, shelters, evacuation and response, and any other means that would lower the magnitude of harm. It can also preemptively strike at weapons depots, high-level commanders, or other valuable resources that would be necessary for the enemy if it were to launch destructive strikes.
Risk manipulation is essentially a reallocation of costs. In the food example, the reduction of risk to consumers entails greater costs on the food industry in conducting safety checks and ensuring product quality. Most of these costs will ultimately be rolled back onto consumers (as reflected in the price of the product); but these costs will be spread more evenly than if, absent such regulatory obligations, several individuals were to consume bad food and suffer the full consequences of it.
In the war case, early warning systems or shelters distribute costs within the state (using public funds to reduce the risk to those who might otherwise be struck), while a preemptive strike seeks to shift the costs of a future war from the striking state to the attacked state.
An obvious concern here is that left to their own devices, and absent special relationship between those concerned, parties have a natural interest in shifting risk away from themselves, even where the consequences are harm to someone else. Especially in the context of war, a potential victim would be only too happy to shift the risks to itself onto its enemies, and even onto foreign citizens who are not enemies. Recent American counterterrorism strategies demonstrate this concern. On September 3, 2012, a U.S. targeted killing operation in Yemen left twelve civilians dead. A year earlier, a targeted killing operation in Pakistan killed four militants and thirty-eight civilians. Unless one believes that each of these operations prevented real and comparable harm to the United States, these are classic examples of risk aversion that results in serious harm to others for an unclear and remote marginal benefit. Certainly, it is hard to believe that the government would have been willing to kill as many U.S. civilians to gain the same benefit.
Another obvious problem is that the true effects of any of these strategies on the expected harm from war are uncertain. An aggressive response to an armed attack might serve to deter the attacker from future violence, but might also help the attacker rally domestic and international constituencies for further attacks. Negotiations can culminate in a mutually-beneficial agreement significantly reducing the risk of war, but might also turn out to be costlier for the would-be victim than a military operation.
Faced with uncertainty, and a natural inclination to shift risk onto others, a guiding principle must be that states must invest in defensive systems as a precondition for any use of force against others. This investment should signal the willingness of the threatened state to absorb some of the costs of risk itself.
A more contentious possibility would be to demand that the state take no violent measure against an external threat that it would not be willing to take against a comparable internal one.
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If this demand were met, it would serve as a strong check on the interest of shifting costs and discounting the harm to enemy nationals. Indeed, one might consider an even stronger, and perhaps more counter-intuitive principle: that states can permissibly do more to reduce internal risks than external risks. That is, first, because using force against external risks violates the international order of sovereign states more than using force against internal risks, and second, because internal constituencies are in a better position than foreigners to hold a government accountable for harms inflicted in the name of risk-reduction. While we find these possibilities intriguing, we do not discuss them here.
VII. Conclusions
Above all else, we have argued for a risk-based approach to thinking about vexed questions in just war theory and the law of war, including issues of when wars must rightly terminate. Even readers who disagree with our specific conclusions will, we hope, find the approach helpful or even illuminating.
Our most important substantive conclusion is that for anyone seeking guaranteed safety, just wars will be inherently unsatisfying, because guaranteed safety is more than we are entitled to demand. We must live with risk. The level of safety we can demand will be limited by the principle of Just Management of Military Risk, according to which we cannot demand more safety than the morally legitimate bearable risk, and checked by the maxim of Minimum Consistency Toward Risks, which requires states to justify the criteria they use to justify risk reduction through military force comparatively with the criteria they use in managing other forms of risk.
As additional checks on state's paranoid or self-serving risk assessments, we emphasize the importance of convincing others-be it the Security Council or other members of the international community-of the significance of the risk that might trigger preventive use of force or continuation of warfare.
We also propose a further limiting or checking principle. Before states can use force preventively, or continue ongoing warfare, they must have invested in defensive systems as a form of risk reduction. We suggest that states must not be biased toward violent methods of risk reduction over more boring and perhaps irritating measures such as civil defense.
